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Religious Naturalism: The Current Debate 
A religious naturalist seeks to combine two beliefs. The first belief is that nature is all there 
is. There is no “ontologically distinct and superior realm (such as God, soul, or heaven) to 
ground, explain, or give meaning to this world” (Stone, 2008, 1). Moreover, the natural 
sciences are the only or at least most reliable source of knowledge about the world. The first 
belief is usually referred to as naturalism. The second belief is that nature, or at least some 
part of nature, can provide religious meaning, purpose, and value analogous to that of 
traditional religion (Crosby, 2007). Some religious naturalists maintain that nature, and its 
internal processes, is sacred, thereby worthy of reverence, awe and wonder (Peters, 2002; 
Crosby, 2015; Kauffman, 2008; Kaufman, 2004; Goodenough, 1998).  
The main task for several religious naturalists is to articulate a position between 
secular/scientific naturalism, which rejects any meaning in nature, and supernaturalism which 
posits meaning outside the natural order (see discussion in Cavanaugh, 2000). Religious 
naturalism, it should be noted, is not a unified view, but covers a variety of beliefs and 
perspectives. This paper will explore the arguments for religious naturalism, different 
versions of religious naturalism, and three demarcation issues that religious naturalism 
currently faces.  
 
1. Arguments in favour of Religious Naturalism 
A religious naturalist considers traditional modes of religion to be scientifically suspicious, 
ecologically dangerous, and spiritually inadequate. Generally in these discussions, arguments 
against supernaturalism are taken as a vindication of naturalism.1 Science, it is argued, takes 
us beyond theism/supernaturalism and towards a naturalistic worldview. For Willem Drees, 
naturalism is simply “a response to the success of the sciences”, and it “stays close to the 
insights offered and concepts developed in the sciences…” (Drees, 1996, 11). To assume a 
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scientific view of the world means, according to Karl Peters, that “we see the causes of things 
in nonpersonal terms, in terms of laws and forces”, in order to understand such causes 
naturalistically (Peters, 2002, 9). There is no division in reality between a natural and 
supernatural domain because “whatever is natural is real whatever real is natural... 
Naturalism rejects the notion that anything at all transcends nature, except nature itself” (Rue, 
2011, 97). Dualistic thinking is seen as incompatible with the methodology and deliverances 
of current science. Drees argues that contemporary science challenges the dualistic notion 
that something can have both mental and physical properties. The neuroscientific accounts of 
consciousness carry important implications for how to understand the nature and causes of 
religious experiences. The correlation between the mental and physical, according to Drees, 
and even the potential reduction of mental states, implies that it is no longer tenable to 
interpret religious experiences theistically; as experiences of God (Drees, 1996, 188-195).  
Gordon D. Kaufman poses a different scientific objection to traditional religion. He argues 
that the notion of a creator God does not match an evolutionary view of reality. The notion of 
a creator God implies a view of a conscious being that brought the world into existence. On 
this view we have mind before matter. Evolution, however, suggests that mind is a secondary 
product which came into existence after billions of years of evolution (Kaufman, 2007, 917; 
Kaufman, 2004, 53-55). Thus, biological evolution clashes with the idea of a creator God 
existing prior to the evolutionary process.  
With the rise of science came the prioritization of mechanistic explanations. Charley 
Hardwick argues that theism, with its emphasis on personal explanations, has been made 
redundant. Naturalism and science in general can account for all that exists without invoking 
intentional explanations. Hardwick writes, “All existence, all order, and all action can be 
accounted for without recourse to the operation of intelligent purpose” (Hardwick, 1996, 16). 
Theism is therefore seen as explanatorily obsolete.   
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Theists typically claim that God interacts with humanity and nature. God is personally 
involved in the final outcome of the cosmos.  Such imagery, however, is seen as religiously 
problematic by religious naturalists discussed herein. Kaufman argues that the “traditional 
idea of God’s purposive activity in the world – a powerful movement working in and through 
all cosmic and historical processes – is almost impossible to reconcile with modern and 
postmodern thinking about evolution and history” (Kaufman, 2004, 42). From a naturalistic 
point of view, “there is no need for some kind of disembodied spirit or God to have brought 
the present creative universe into being...” (Crosby, 2015, 91). Furthermore, the idea of God 
acting in nature leads to theological incoherency, as God has to go against God’s own laws 
(Drees, 2008, 110). 
The conclusion reached by these naturalists, given the problems of supernaturalism and 
explanatory success of the physical sciences, is that we live in a natural world where “all 
natural facts can be construed, in some minimal sense at least, in terms of the organization of 
matter” (Rue, 2005, 14). However, one “can affirm naturalism without affirming religious 
naturalism...” (Cavanaugh, 2000, 243). What are some of the reasons, then, for specifically a 
religious construal of naturalism, and a religious/spiritual appreciation of nature? Several 
religious naturalists appeal to our current ecological situation. Kaufman, for example, 
maintains that Christian theology has been too human-centred, structured around a rather 
anthropomorphic conception of God. The traditional Christian view of God and the 
accompanying idea “that humans are created in the image of this God, tends to obscure and 
dilute... ecological ways of thinking about our place in the world” (Kaufman, 2004, 41). 
Similarly, Loyal Rue, drawing on Lynn White Jr.’s infamous 1967 article in Science, argues 
that the Judeo-Christian tradition has unfortunately promoted “the view that nature’s purpose 
was to serve humans” (Rue, 2005, 353). The dualistic mind-set of traditional religion, 
according to Peters, has led many to identify the natural world as evil and a source of 
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temptation (Peters, 2002, 102). In this way, nature becomes a rival to a devotional 
relationship with God. Nature has not been properly valued in the received religious 
traditions of the world, hence religious naturalists seek to develop new images of God which 
can help to articulate our dependency on the integrity of nature.2 
 
Reductive and non-reductive religious naturalism 
Religious naturalism holds within itself different types of naturalism and different ways of 
thinking about the religious potentiality of naturalism. One could say that “religious 
naturalism” functions as an umbrella term. I will first address the issue of naturalism(s), and 
in the next section I will draw up different ways of articulating religious stances within a 
naturalistic framework.  
While all religious naturalists seem to subscribe to a general form of monism – meaning 
that there is one reality – they express their naturalistic sympathies differently. Religious 
naturalists such as Willem Drees and Charley Hardwick have opted for more restrictive or 
reductionist versions of naturalism. Drees argues for constitutive reductionism, meaning that 
our “natural world is a unity in the sense that all entities are made up of the same 
constituents” (Drees, 1996, 14). Physics, on this view, holds a prominent place in our 
collective epistemological endeavour to understand reality. Physics “offers us the best 
available description of these constituents and thus our natural world at its finest level of 
analysis” (Ibid). In a similar physicalist spirit, Hardwick states that there is “No difference 
without a physical difference” and that “All truth is determined by physical truth” (Hardwick, 
1996, 43). For Hardwick, theology is significantly “constrained by physicalism” (Hardwick, 
2003, 111). Although Drees and Hardwick pursue reductive paths when it comes to 
naturalism, they both acknowledge that not everything can be articulated through scientific 
categories. They both employ what might be called semantic or explanatory irreducibility; 
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that “the description and explanation of phenomena may require concepts which do not 
belong to the vocabulary of fundamental physics” and that the various domains and 
discourses above physics possess “explanatory autonomy” (Drees, 1996, 16; Hardwick, 1996, 
36).3 Yet, on an ontological level these proposals remain reductionist.4 
However, the majority of religious naturalists herein opt for non-reductive versions of 
naturalism, commonly construed through emergence theory. We can see emergentist ideas 
employed by Goodenough, Peters, Kaufman, Kauffman, Crosby, and Rue.5 An emergentist 
ontology claims something like the following: the material world “consist of levels of 
organization” (Rue, 2011, 51); “reality is divided into a number of distinct levels of order” 
(Kauffman and Clayton, 2006, 503);  “new properties of matter come into being” through 
complex organization (Crosby, 2015, 30); “something else can, in turn, participate in 
generating a new something else at a different level of organization” (Goodenough and 
Deacon, 2006, 854). Moreover, emergent properties are irreducible with respect to physics, 
and underlying physical base structure give rise to emergent phenomena that are “not 
predictable from, or reducible to, our knowledge of the properties and dynamics of lower-
level systems” (Rue, 2011, 52; see also Kauffman, 2008, 31-43). As Kaufman says, “We do 
not (and may never be able to?) understand the mystery of how greater and more complex 
things can come out of simpler and lesser things” (Kaufman, 2004, 92). With these anti-
reductionist remarks we also get ideas of downward causation, that higher-level phenomena 
can causally affect their constituent parts or physical base structure (Rue, 2011, 52; Kauffman 
and Clayton, 2006, 516; Crosby, 2015, 61-63). Indeed, some religious naturalists claim that 
self-organizational laws are themselves emergent and so defy physical reduction (Kauffman, 
1995). Indeed, while physical explanations might provide some insight they cannot “give us 
any real knowledge of the future toward which this whole creative process may be moving” 
(Kaufman, 2004, 93). Emergentism fends off the threat of scientism6 and, according to these 
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religious naturalists, provides a pluralist ontology, meaning that the universe is best described 
as a “pluriverse” (Crosby, 2015, 34). This goes against the more monistic commitments of 
Drees and Hardwick. As will be seen, this issue of monism versus pluralism lends itself to 
quite different construals of the religious dimension of religious naturalism. 
 
Religious Stances within Religious Naturalism  
It is possible to identify at least four ways of affirming religious aspects of reality from the 
perspective of naturalism: 
(1) Religious aspects of reality refer to events, norms, or values which 
transcend purely physical categories (while at the same time being 
natural).  
(2) The possibility of a religious conception lies in the limits and 
explanatory gaps of science. 
(3) What is religious about nature refers to a specific aspect of it. 
(4) What is religious about reality refers to nature as a whole. 
The reductive naturalist Hardwick admits the religious implications of physicalism: “‘God’ 
cannot be found in the ontological inventory of what exists” and there is “nothing referentially 
significant in a religious sense about nature as a whole or in its parts” (Hardwick, 2003, 113). 
Hardwick, writing from within the Christian tradition, suggests a non-metaphysical reading of 
the claims of Christianity through Rudolf Bultmann’s existentialist framework. The Christian 
faith is construed as a “seeing- (and experiencing-) as”, as a way of “taking the world” 
(Hardwick, 1996, 158). The proposition “God exists”, therefore, does not refer to anything 
existing or an objective part of reality. Theological statements should be considered 
“valuational”, in the sense that they are meta-expressions “for a form of life that is expressed 
as a theistic seeing-as” (Ibid.,114). Through this particular way of conceiving the world we 
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can, Hardwick suggests, encounter “events of grace” (Ibid., 156, 185). Hardwick expresses 
religious stance (1) in his physicalist and existentialist reading of Christianity. 
Drees’s monistic naturalism relies heavily on the methodology and explanatory power of 
the sciences. Yet, on numerous occasions he stresses the epistemic limitations of science and 
so seems to express (2). Science cannot, not even in principle, properly answer “limit-
questions” regarding the “most fundamental constituents of, or structure in reality” (Drees, 
1996, 267). Science, therefore, “does not address the cosmological dimension of religion...” 
(Drees, 2017, 255). The intrinsic limitations of science create space for a religious 
interpretation of reality, hence it is possible to posit “God” as an answer to such limit-
questions.7 We are both wandering and wondering humans – meaning that we are immersed 
within our particular environments and face the unavoidable limitations of our epistemic 
reach (Drees, 1996, 274-283). 
 Option (3) is to place the religious focus on specific aspects of nature. This orientation is 
shared by several religious naturalists. Religious naturalists such as Kaufman, Peters, and 
Kauffman have proposed that we think of God as the “creativity of the universe”, and that we 
should articulate the symbol of “God” in terms of evolutionary development. On this view, 
we should change our conception of God as The Creator to what is called “serendipitous 
creativity”, or the “creativity manifest throughout the cosmos” (Kaufman, 2004, 48). God is 
the ongoing creativity of this world and the “evolutionary processes that today are believed to 
have brought into being, in the course of some billions of years, countless different sorts of 
creatures, including humans” (Kaufman, 2007, 918).8 In a similar way to Kaufman, Peters 
employs the notion of serendipitous creativity to capture the “nonpersonal way of describing 
the ever-present working of the sacred” (Peters, 2002, 36). This creativity, for Peters, is a two-
part process: “one part gives rise to new variations in the cosmos, in life, and in human 
society; the other part selects and continues some of these new variations, which in turn 
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contribute to further creation” (Ibid., 37; cf. Peters 2007, 53). Thus, “God” symbolises the 
different material interactions within the world that give “rise to new possibilities of existence 
and then selects some of these to continue” (Peters, 2008, 23).9 Kauffman puts this theological 
proposal in relation to our current global challenges, manifested most strongly in our current 
ecological crisis. By retrieving an immanent conception of God, according to Kauffman, “we 
can, at last, take responsibility for what we call sacred, and thus treat as sacred” (Kauffman, 
2008, 287).10 We need to reinvent the Sacred by finding new ways of articulating the nature 
of God in an evolutionary world. Kauffman is clear about the fact that how we construe God 
is a pragmatic decision: “It has always been us, down the millennia, talking to ourselves. Then 
let us talk to ourselves consciously, let us choose our own sacred...” (Kauffman, 2008, 286).11 
Lastly, there are religious naturalists who maintain that nature as a whole should be 
construed as religiously significant (4). Donald Crosby, who prefers to speak of “a religion of 
nature” (as opposed to religious naturalism),12 states that we should “grant to nature the kind 
of reverence, awe, love, and devotion we in the West have formerly reserved for God” 
(Crosby, 2002, xi).13 Nature is religiously ultimate, according to Crosby, because nature is the 
source of life, provider of beauty and order, and “the ultimate source of the good of human 
life itself, and all of the specific goods of human history, civilization, and experience” (Ibid., 
159). Crosby is aware of the fact that nature is ambiguous, that it contains both goods and 
evils, enjoyment and suffering. This, however, does not count against the validity of 
construing nature religiously. Ambiguity is a necessary part of our world, according to 
Crosby, so if we negate the evils we also have to negate the goods.14 Nature’s creativity 
would be absent in a perfect world, as nature’s “creations are bought at the price of its 
destructions” (Crosby, 2008, 27). Loyal Rue follows a similar path to Crosby by taking nature 
as whole to be construable as a religious object. One of Rue’s main assumptions is that 
religions are mythic traditions; they offer narrative accounts of cosmology and morality, and 
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the joining of these two is achieved through a root metaphor. Such root metaphors are “God”, 
“Nature”, and the “Dharma”. Rue argues that traditional myths have lost power due to the 
“creeping non-realism” produced by a) modern science, and b) religious diversity (Rue, 2005, 
316).  
Naturalism can provide a story which, centred on the evolutionary origin of all life, has the 
potential of uniting the dispersed cultures of humanity. Moreover, given the ecological 
challenges we need a biocentric myth, according to Rue. This myth would affirm the integrity 
of nature, and that nature is the ultimate source of life. Thus, Rue’s solution to the increasing 
non-realist erosion of religious myths is to understand nature as humanity’s sacred object, 
which he believes is compatible with both naturalism and realism.15 Nature as “root metaphor 
renders the real sacred and the sacred real” (Rue, 2005, 127).  
 
Demarcation Issues for Religious Naturalism 
A main ambition for religious naturalists, as we have seen, is to steer a path between the 
Scylla of pessimistic secularism and the Charybdis of supernaturalism. However, this attempt 
at carving out a golden path leads to a series of demarcation issues for religious naturalism. 
That is, how do we separate religious naturalism from neighbouring perspectives? The 
perspectives I have in mind, and which share many of the key beliefs of religious naturalism 
(monistic and pluralistic), are non-religious naturalism, religious fictionalism and religious 
agnosticism.  
DEMARCATION ISSUE 1: How should we understand the difference between someone who 
interprets naturalism religiously and one who does not? Rue seems to think that the difference 
between religious naturalism and the non-religious take on naturalism is quite obvious. A 
religious naturalist is a sunny (optimistic) naturalist16, compared to the “aggressive cranks and 
party-poopers such as Richard Dawkins and Sam Harris” (Rue, 2011, 123). It is true that new 
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atheist discourse is characterized by a polemical and frequently aggressive tone concerning 
the existence and effects of religion. It is also true, however, that both Dawkins and Harris 
affirm the awe-inspiring story mediated by science,17 and the possibility of a secular 
spirituality on par with that of traditional religion.18 Religious naturalists often try to distance 
themselves from  non-religious naturalism and argue that their religiously conceptualized 
naturalism can be distinguished from New Atheism, but the line between them, given 
importance of awe and wonder for many new atheists, is blurred.19 Religious naturalists claim 
to have developed a via media between New Atheism/non-religious naturalism and traditional 
religion. Nevertheless, in order to uphold this via media religious naturalists need to offer 
better reasons for thinking that their position differs significantly from the awe-affirming New 
Atheism of Harris, Dawkins, and others. Otherwise this remains a problematic demarcation 
issue for religious naturalism. 
Indeed, if we consider the monistic naturalism of Drees and Hardwick it gets even harder 
to differentiate religious naturalism from its non-religious counterpart. Hardwick states, as we 
saw, that there is “nothing referentially significant in a religious sense about nature as a whole 
or in its parts” (Hardwick, 2003, 113). Drees rejects divine presence in the world (Drees, 
1996, 92-106), affirms identitism regarding the mind-brain relationship (Ibid., 183-189), and 
denies human subjectivity and the objectivity of moral values and norms (Ibid., 216-221). The 
religious beliefs of monistic naturalism, it seems, “are so minimal as to be virtually 
nonexistent” (Griffin, 1997, 595).20 Monistic naturalism, thus, makes it even more difficult to 
locate the dividing line between religious naturalism and non-religious naturalism. Religious 
naturalists of the monistic type need to positively construe and bring out the religious 
relevance of naturalism, otherwise this framing of naturalism runs the risk of collapsing into a 
meaning-negating, non-religious naturalism. 
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It seems, then, that a religious naturalism that affirms a pluralistic/emergentist ontology 
would do better. That is, an ontology that affirms the emergent reality of value and meaning 
and a creative process throughout the physical might be able to more successfully articulate 
the religious dimension of naturalism. It certainly has more of a religious vibe to it, compared 
to monistic naturalism. However, it is not obvious why a non-religious naturalist who affirms 
the reality of emergent phenomena has to think of such phenomena in religious terms. This is 
because, “it does not seem to be possible to deduce these philosophical and theological 
interpretations [that we find in religious naturalism] from emergence theories as presently 
conceived. One who studies emergence theory and who comes to recognize the positive 
ontological status of emergent properties, that there seem to be emergent properties that are 
ontologically irreducible... is not deductively, or empirically, forced to adopt a religious 
conceptualization of the same properties” (Leidenhag, 2013, 976). Stuart Kauffman concedes 
this point, saying that one is not “logically forced” to sacralise emergent properties 
(Kauffman, 2007, 903), that we “do not have to use the God word [for describing the 
emergent character of the universe], but it may be wise to do so to help orient our lives” 
(Kauffman, 2008, 285).21 Similarly Gordon Kaufman, with his emphasis on “theology as 
imaginative construction”, seems to say that theological interpretations of emergence theory 
boil down to a matter pragmatic choice (Kaufman, 1993, 32-44). Given this strong pragmatic 
dimension, it becomes difficult to justify a religious conceptualization of naturalism over a 
non-religious one. Pluralistic naturalism faces, in similar vein to monistic naturalism, the task 
of bringing out the religious relevance of natural phenomena – in this case emergent features, 
structures, and properties. If this issue is left unaddressed, then religious naturalism will come 
across as an oxymoron.22 
DEMARCATION ISSUE 2: Given the strong pragmatic dimension to different expressions 
of religious naturalism, one might wonder if religious naturalism is actually a version of 
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religious fictionalism. The literature on religious fictionalism is vast, but a person who affirms 
such a view typically holds that a) there are deep problems with realist interpretations of 
supernatural/non-natural realities, b) we should not discard supernatural/non-natural 
discourses, because c) supernatural/non-natural discourses serve some useful purpose.23 The 
clearest expression of such view can be found in one of the earlier writings of Loyal Rue. Rue 
believes that the survival of humanity depends on a shared myth and a biocentric myth in 
particular; an ecologically informed myth that focuses on the “conditions for a rich diversity 
of life forms” (Rue, 1994, 304).  A biocentric myth enables human flourishing, and the 
achievement of personal wholeness and social coherence.24 Rue is clear on the fact that it is a 
lie, but it is a noble lie as it helps people to more fully enjoy life, despite the harsh truth of 
naturalism. Rue writes, “Biocentrism is your story and mine. It is everybody’s story. It 
presumes to tell us how things are and which things matter. It is, nevertheless, a lie” (Ibid., 
306).25 Such candid remarks bring religious naturalism significantly closer to a fictionalist 
understanding of religious discourse. Yet, Rue affirms simultaneously realism regarding 
religion, suggesting that anti-realism threatens the spiritual effectiveness of religious 
traditions (Rue, 2005, 130-131). Hence, in this case we have a tension between, on the one 
hand, a realist affirmation of religious discourses and, on the other hand, a fictionalist and 
akin to anti-realist understanding of the nature and function of religion.  This raises an 
important issue – but which goes beyond the scope of this paper – can you believe in 
something (e.g. partake in religious practices and communities) that you simultaneously 
believe is factually untrue?26 
DEMARCATION ISSUE 3: Another demarcation issue concerns the difference between 
religious naturalism and religious agnosticism.27 Willem Drees has addressed the fluidity 
between his own religiously tinted naturalism and an agnostic approach to religious 
discourses. The notion of mystery has a central place within Drees’ naturalism (Drees, 2002, 
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14-19). While science is an impressive human endeavour, “explanatory successes do not 
exclude further questions. Again and again, questions emerge at the limits of scientific 
understanding” (Drees, 2002, 18). As described above, limit-questions form an integral part of 
Drees’ religious vision, the kind of questions that arise at the end of scientific investigations 
concerning the nature of nature or the origin of the physical. For Drees, limit-questions can 
provide the starting point for a naturalistic spirituality, in that they may “induce a sense of 
wonder and gratitude about the reality to which we belong” (Drees, 1996, 281).Yet, he has 
expressed some issues with the fact that many want to, perhaps too quickly, place him within 
the broader camp of religious naturalism: “Am I a religious naturalist? Others have used the 
label for me. I am not sure that I like the label, as it seems to constrain, whereas I want to 
explore” (Drees, 2006, 121). Indeed, in some respects Drees’ offered naturalism seems to 
align itself with a version of religious agnosticism, and perhaps even the apophatic strands of 
Christian theology. A “serious agnostic”, according to Drees, is not a lazy agnostic – someone 
who refuses to understand or explore as much as possible – but someone who adopts 
“epistemic modesty” in light of the richness of reality (Drees, 2010, 111). “Honest 
agnosticism” is firmly rooted in philosophical and theological thought. Apophatic thinkers, 
such as Nicolas of Cusa, stress the need for negative theology, which recognizes “the 
categorical distinction between God and creation, and thus the inadequacy of any analogy we 
construct” (Drees, 2010, 111). As human creatures, knowledge of both world and God will 
always be limited. This is because, we “never see the universe ‘from outside’, from the 
perspective of eternity, but always from within. This is also a problem when we speak of God; 
we are within the universe while we attempt to speak about something more encompassing” 
(Drees, 2002, 19). Given the limited nature of human speech and knowing, God will always 
transcend the humanly conceivable: God is radically transcendent (Drees, 1996, 259-266).28 
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The spirit of agnosticism is also evident in the earlier writings of Gordon Kaufman. 
Theological investigations will never be able to successfully capture God.  If we claimed to 
have done so, to have gained control over God, we have merely created an idol. As Kaufman 
says, “What we will have gained control of will be at most something of our own 
manufacture; to simply identify this directly with the mystery of God would be idolatry” 
(Kaufman, 1993, 16). Kaufman, influenced deeply by a Kantian epistemology, argues that 
theology can no longer be conceived of as a straight-forward metaphysical enterprise. The 
concept of “world” is always a construct of the mind, as the world is never an object of direct 
perception (Kaufman 1981, 242).  Likewise, “the concept of God…can be properly 
understood only as a construct of the mind” (Kaufman 1981, 243). Central metaphysical 
concepts, such as “world”, “I”, and “God”, are created by human minds to serve particular 
intramental functions and purposes. His view of God is articulated in terms of an agnostic 
stance. This is not “a cynical agnosticism…that is destructive of everything that humans 
believe in and need; but that agnosticism which indirectly opens us to what is beyond our 
world…” (Kaufman, 1993, 58).29 
Thus, similarly to Drees’ emphasis on human knowledge as limited and provisional, 
Kaufman’s agnosticism constitutes a starting point for a religious orientation towards ultimate 
reality; an ultimate reality which is best characterized as “mystery”. If we look at Drees’ and 
Kaufman’s proposals, they might best be understood as versions of religious agnosticism. 
How much agnosticism, then, can religious naturalism tolerate while still being considered 
naturalistic in any meaningful sense? If science encounters unsolvable limit-questions, as 
Drees suggests, and if human beings are cognitively limited, which Kaufman claims on his 
Kantian-inspired epistemology, then this form of naturalism cannot coherently rule out 
theism. However, this seems to undermine the underlying naturalistic ontology of Drees’ and 
Kaufman’s religious proposals? Can we separate religious naturalism from religious 
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agnosticism, and does not an agnostic spirit undermine naturalism? This is certainly another 
demarcation issue facing contemporary religious naturalism.  
 
Concluding remarks  
This article has provided an overview of central issues and positions within religious 
naturalism. Religious naturalism, it was shown, is construed reductively and non-reductively 
through monistic and pluralistic ontologies. Moreover, it is possible to identify (at least) four 
distinct ways of affirming religious aspects of reality within religious naturalism. Lastly, this 
article presented three different demarcation issues for religious naturalism.30 
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1	Jerome	Stone	concedes	that	it	is	impossible	to	provide	proof	for	religious	naturalism;	rather	“it	will	be	a	
wager,	a	reasoned,	weighted	wager,	and	one	side	will	appear	more	likely	to	be	true”	Stone	(2017,	2).		He	
further	divides	the	argument	for	religious	naturalism	in	terms	of	negative	and	positive	arguments.	A	negative	
argument	for	religious	naturalism,	or	a	naturalistic	ontology	in	general,	is	based	on	the	failure	of	arguments	for	
the	existence	of	God.	A	positive	argument	for	religious	naturalism	means	“that	you	can	have	many	of	the	
positive	values	of	a	religious	or	spiritual	life”	without	having	to	address	some	of	the	deepest	problems	of	
traditional	religion:	problem	of	evil,	how	to	reconcile	science	and	religion,	and	so	on.	Stone	(2017,	2-3).			
2	Michael	Hogue	puts	particular	emphasis	on	the	ecological	dimension	in	his	treatment	of	religious	naturalism.	
He	focuses	particularly	on	Loyal	Rue,	Jerome	A.	Stone,	Ursula	Goodenough,	and	Donald	Crosby.	See	Hogue	
(2010).	
3	Hardwick	describes	the	task	of	combining	ontological	reductionism	with	semantic	irreducibility	in	this	way:	“a	
physicalist	must,	at	the	same	time,	(1)	claim	that	underlying	all	domains	there	is	a	unity	in	which	all	truth	is	
determined	by	truths	at	the	level	of	physics,	yet	(2)	not	assert	that	these	other	domains	are	either	identical	to	
or	nothing	more	that	the	domain	of	physical	entities	and	the	discourse	in	physics	about	them”	(Hardwick,	
1996,	36).	See	also,	Hardwick	(2003).		
4	Drees	employs	a	form	of	conceptual	emergentism.	He	argues	that	“emergence	and	ontological	reduction	are	
not	opposed”	(Drees,	2007,	72).	This	is	because	while	reality	is	reducible	to	the	basic	level	of	physics	we	might	
need	“new	concepts”	to	capture	complex	phenomena.		
5	It	should	be	noted,	however,	that	Rue’s	earlier	work	is	more	materialist	than	emergentist.	See	Rue’s	
discussion	regarding	scientific	materialism	in	(2005,	14-16).	
6	See	Crosby	(2011)	for	an	extensive	critique	of	scientism	and	the	attempt	to	reduce	“knowledge”	to	scientific	
knowledge.		
7	Drees,	however,	argues	that	the	phenomenon	of	limit-questions	should	not	be	interpreted	as	evidence	for	a	
theistic	reality,	“however	they	could	serve	as	proposals	for	answers	to	those	limit-questions”	(Drees,	1996,	
281).	Yet,	Drees	also	argues	that	“God”	should	not	be	interpreted	realistically	given	the	problems	of	
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theological	realism.	He	says,	“I	draw	upon	this	non-temporal	understanding	of	God’s	transcendence	and	upon	
theologies	which	build	upon	an	evolutionary	understanding	of	religion,	relating	their	concept	of	God	to	‘the	
way	things	really	are’…	However,	such	ideas	are	not	so	much	affirmed	as	realist	claims,	but	rather	accepted	as	
speculations	and	regulative	ideals.”	Drees	(1996,	237.	My	italics).		
8	Kaufman	employs	three	different	modes	of	creativity	for	talking	about	the	richness	and	complexity	of	the	
natural	world.	Creativity1	refers	to	the	initial	coming	into	being	of	the	universe.	The	term	Creativity2	designates	
those	complex	physical	processes	that	progressively	give	rise	to	complex	creatures	(human	beings	and	
animals).	Lastly,	Creativity3	refers	to	the	creativity	manifested	in	us;	that	is,	human	symbolic	creativity.	See	
Kaufman	(2004,	76).		
9	Peters	has	discussed	the	implications	of	this	model	for	Christian	understandings	of	human	salvation.	See	
Peters	(2012,	843-869).	
10	Kauffman’s	earlier	work	is	characterized	by	a	strong	commitment	to	emergence	theory.	Lately,	however,	
Kauffman	has	explored	the	fruitfulness	of	panpsychism	for	articulating	a	natural	conception	of	the	sacred,	as	
well	as	a	participatory	view	of	the	universe.	See	Kauffman	(2016a)	and	Kauffman	(2016b,	36-47).	
11	He	also	writes,	“It	is	our	choice	whether	we	use	the	God	word.	I	believe	it	is	wise	to	do	so.	God	can	be	our	
shared	name	for	the	true	creativity	in	the	natural	universe.	Such	a	view	invites	a	sense	of	the	sacred,	as	those	
aspects	of	the	creativity	in	the	universe	that	we	deem	worthy	of	holding	sacred.	We	are	not	logically	forced	to	
this	view”	Kauffman	(2007,	903).	
12	Crosby	who	prefers	to	label	his	approach	“religion	of	nature”	still	acknowledges	his	view	to	be	“one	of	at	
least	four	general	categories	of	religious	naturalism”	(2002,	172n.	14).		
13	For	Crosby,	an	objective	and	realist	view	regarding	the	religious	significance	of	nature	can	be	defended	via	
six	“role-functional	categories”:	uniqueness,	primacy,	pervasiveness,	rightness,	permanence,	and	hiddenness.				
Such	role-functional	categories	are	commonly	associated	with	a	religious	object	and	they	can,	according	to	
Crosby,	be	applied	to	nature	as	a	whole.	See	discussion	in	Crosby	(2002,	117-118).		
14	See	also	Jerome	Stone’s	discussion	regarding	moral	and	religious	ambiguity	in	recent	religious	naturalism:		
(2004,	225-246).	
15	It	is	worth	noting	that	Loyal	Rue’s	strong	defence	of	religious/mythic	realism	puts	him,	to	some	extent,	in	
opposition	to	the	more	pragmatic	considerations	expressed	by	Gordon	Kaufman,	Stuart	Kauffman,	and	Karl	
Peters.		
16	John	F.	Haught	makes	the	distinction	between	sober	and	sunny	naturalists.	A	sober	naturalist	is	someone	
who	maintains	that	“nature	is	all	there	is,	but	for	them	nature	is	not	resourceful	enough	to	satisfy	the	
voracious	human	hunger	for	meaning	and	happiness.”	A	sunny	naturalist,	on	the	other	hand,	holds	“that	
nature’s	overwhelming	beauty,	the	excitement	of	human	creativity,	the	struggle	to	achieve	ethical	goodness,	
the	prospect	of	loving	and	being	loved,	the	exhilaration	of	scientific	discovery	–	these	are	enough	to	fill	a	
person’s	life.”	Haught	(2006,	10).		
17	In	(1998,	xi)	Dawkins	writes,	“The	feeling	of	awed	wonder	that	science	can	give	us	is	one	of	the	highest	
experiences	of	which	the	human	psyche	is	capable.	It	is	a	deep	aesthetic	passion	to	rank	with	the	finest	that	
music	and	poetry	can	deliver.	It	is	truly	one	of	the	things	that	make	life	worth	living.”		
18	See	Harris	(2004,	204-222)	and	Harris	(2014).		
19	Victor	Stenger,	a	proponent	of	new	atheism,	affirms	something	similar,	“Beauty	and	inspiration	can	arise	
from	secular	sources.	Certainly	much	great	art	and	literature	is	secular	in	nature”,	“God	is	not	necessary	for	
someone	to	find	fulfilment	in	contemplation	or	social	activity”	Stenger	(2007,	254,	252).	He	also	writes,	“Many	
people	think	of	science	as	cold	and	impersonal.	Scientists	have	tried	to	counter	that	by	pointing	to	the	beauty	
and	majesty	of	nature	and	the	great	pleasure	and	inspiration	that	science	brings	to	its	practitioners”	(2007,	
255).				
20	See	David	Ray	Griffin’s	overview	and	critique	of	Willem	Drees’	religious	naturalism:	Griffin	(1997,	593-614).	
21	Kauffman	also	writes,	“Can	I	logically	force	you	to	this	sense	of	the	sacred?	No.	But	the	vastness	of	nature,	
the	wealth	of	invention	in	the	bio-sphere	and	human	historicity	can	invite	you”	(Kauffman,	2008,	284).		
22	See	John	F.	Haught	(2003,	769-782).		
23	See	the	following	for	stances	on	and	articulations	of	religious	fictionalism:	Eshleman	(2005,	183-199),	Le	
Poidevin	(2003,	271-284),	Le	Poidevin	(2016,	178-192),	Harrison	(2010,	43-58),	Cordry	(2010,	77-89),	and	
Lipton	(2007,	31-46).		
24	For	more	on	the	importance	of	personal	wholeness	and	social	coherence	within	Rue’s	naturalism:	see	Rue,	
(2005,	9-10,	75-77,	160-164,	251,	255);	Rue	(2011,	65-67,	74-76,	143-144,	149).		
25	Interestingly,	despite	Rue’s	fictionalist	stance	he	also	defends	realism	as	necessary	presupposition	for	the	
spiritual	effectiveness	of	mythic	traditions.	See	Rue	(2005,	130-131,	200,	317).	
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26	For	a	critique	of	religious	fictionalism,	see	Cordry	(2010,	77-89).	
27	This	issue	has	also	been	explored	by	Mikael	Stenmark	(2013,	546-547).	
28	As	Niels	Henrik	Gregersen	points	out,	Drees’	theism	seems	to	entail	Atemporal	Theism,	which	suggests	that	
although	“God	is	the	creator	of	a	temporal	world,	God	is	unimaginatively	beyond	time	and	change”	Gregersen	
(2008,	291).		
29	How	deep	should	this	agnostic	orientation	go?	Will	an	all-encompassing	agnosticism	simply	undermine	all	
attempts	at	constructive	theology?	Regarding	this	issue,	Kaufman	answers:	“Therefore,	any	thoroughgoing	
agnostic	response	to	all	metaphysical	questions	–	a	refusal	to	take	any	position	at	all	on	the	place	of	humanity	
within	the	cosmic	scheme	of	things	–	is	clearly	a	rejection	from	the	outset	of	all	moves	toward	constructing	an	
understanding	of	reality	in	which	God	has	a	significant	place.	It	must	be	granted,	however,	that	a	metaphysical	
agnosticism	of	this	sort	does	not	necessarily	close	the	door	on	every	significantly	‘Christian’	orientation	on	
human	life	and	the	world”	(Kaufman,	1993:	242).		
30	I	would	like	to	thank	an	anonymous	reviewer	for	his/her	constructive	comments	which	helped	me	to	
improve	and	clarify	this	paper.			
